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such as bus or rail, and with its international counterparts. The result
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8The Study in Brief
Canadians and their governments tend to see the air transport sector as particularly important to the
national economy: a heavy regulatory influence over the sector, as exemplified by foreign ownership limits
on airlines, is one manifestation of this perception. Along with regulation, however, the sector is burdened
with taxes and fees that are high, relative to other transport modes and industry sectors, and may threaten
industry growth and firm survival.
This Commentary introduces a new and unique analysis, comparing the effective tax rates on airline
costs in Canada with those in other sectors and in the United States. In Canada, the marginal effective tax
rate on airline costs is 14.5 percent, compared to 10.6 percent for passenger rail, for example. Canadian
airlines also face a heavier tax burden than their counterparts in the US: The effective tax rate on airline
costs for domestic flights is 16.8 percent in Canada, compared to 12.0 percent in the US. For international
flights, the effective tax rate is 11.2 percent in Canada, compared to 8.9 percent in the United States.
If the aviation sector is to be at its most productive in facilitating personal and commercial travel,
tax policy changes are in order. This Commentary identifies sensible places to begin. Among them:
• reforming fuel taxes, which are problematic in their unequal application across provincial and
international borders;
￿ balancing the government’s airport security charge revenue with spending on security;
￿ revising the rent formula so that Canada’s various airport authorities pay no more than the
imputed rental value of the assets that they inherited from the government;
￿ reducing the air transport sector’s effective tax rate relative to other sectors;
￿ launching a review of airline ownership restrictions, and a reconsideration of their role in the
global economic environment.
The federal government should ensure that Canada’s air transportation industry is taxed on a level playing
field with other modes of travel, such as bus or rail, and with its international counterparts. The result
would be a more internationally competitive airline sector, able to serve Canadian air travelers more
efficiently and cheaply.
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anadian air travelers had reason to be alarmed by the precedent. In July
2006, France introduced a “solidarity tax“ on airline tickets to generate
funds for social programs such as the fight against HIV/AIDs.
Depending on the length of flight and the class of travel, this tax will
cost passengers departing France up to $52, thus raising as much as $277 million
annually. France has claimed that a further 18 countries will introduce similar
taxes;
1 so far, four countries (Chile, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Mauritius) have
followed France’s lead and others may do the same.
Canada has not yet agreed to the idea. This is commendable on two counts.
First, there is no economic reason to burden the airline industry with a targeted
tax, even if aimed at noble causes. Perhaps when air travel was largely restricted
to the rich, such a luxury tax could fly. In today’s world, where low-cost carriers
make the skies accessible to less well-off travelers, it would be a regressive tax,
and could deter travel to developing countries, whose prosperity is increasingly
dependent on global trade, commerce and tourism. Second, the fiscal burden on
Canada’s air transport sector is already heavy with taxes and fees.
A comparative assessment of this tax burden, which we undertake in this
paper, reveals that the current tax treatment of airlines is inequitable and
inefficient. We argue that the federal government should recognize these shortfalls
and revamp its air transport policy. Among the recommended reforms: fuel taxes,
currently applied unevenly and inequitably across jurisdictions, should ideally be
scrapped altogether, unless earmarked for either air infrastructure or
environmental investment;  airport security charges, which far surpass
government spending on airport security, should be reduced to the point where
the program breaks even; the rent formula under which airport authorities pay
rent to the federal government should be revised so that they pay no more than
the imputed “rental“ value of their land and assets.
The goal is to ensure that this sector of the economy is taxed on a level playing
field with other transportation modes domestically and other airline sectors
internationally. This would be a small step toward making our airlines more
competitive internationally and less vulnerable to the cyclical downturns inherent
in the business. And it will be an especially crucial change if we are to seek a more
liberal market for air travel with other countries, particularly the US.
The Economic Role of Canada’s Airline Industry
In 2005/06, the airline industry employed about 80,000 people in Canada and
directly accounted for roughly 0.4 percent of GDP. While these numbers could be
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* Ben Cherniavsky is an active equity analyst who holds no stock in Canadian airlines. The authors
would like to thank: Finn Poschmann and research staff at the C.D. Howe Institute; numerous
anonymous reviewers for their comments; as well as Duanjie Chen (George Weston Tax Analyst
at the Institute) for her invaluable contribution to our analysis. We especially thank the many
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1 They are Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Congo, Cyprus, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast,
Jordan, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Norway, South Korea and the
United Kingdom. Norway and the UK have since decided against introducing new solidarity
taxes (instead deciding to contribute funds from already collected taxes).considered small on a relative basis, it would be wrong to assume that the
government need not make airline tax reform a high priority or that constructive
change would benefit only a narrow sector of the economy. First, a significant
amount (38 percent) of the revenue that the government collects from this industry
comes from taxes that are levied on ticket sales. Relief on this front would benefit
the passengers — over 63 million of them in 2005 — who take flights every year in
Canada.
Second, the Canadian airline industry exerts an indirect influence over the
Canadian economy. Airports, for example, employ thousands of people and
generate millions of dollars of revenue for their commercial tenants. The same can
be said of their impact on hotels, taxis, travel agents, and other businesses that
service air travellers.
There are also positive economic and social benefits associated with the airline
industry that are hard to quantify. These include the countless transactions that are
facilitated by air travel to business meetings, or the intangible personal pleasures
that are associated with air travel for vacation, and visiting friends and relatives. 
Notwithstanding difficulties in measuring the sector’s economic importance,
Canadians and their governments see air transport as an activity with national
significance — as exemplified by Air Canada’s legacy as a Crown corporation.
Policymakers have also treated airlines as too big or too important to fail — as
shown by attempts to prop up Canadian Airlines. And the government continues
to protect the industry through other means. For example, foreigners are limited to
owning no more than 25 percent of an airline domiciled in Canada, based on the
notion that control over an airline is too important an economic and strategic lever
to let slip into nonresident hands. Yet air transport is nonetheless burdened with
taxes and fees that are high (relative to other sectors and transport modes) and
may threaten industry growth and firm survival.
Although we focus here on the need for tax policy reform, ownership
regulations also require review. They arguably do the airlines more harm than
good, by creating a fragmented industry that does not manage growth well or
perform effectively through market downturns. With its enormous capital
requirements, generally mature market, and global operations, it is difficult to
imagine a business more suited for worldwide consolidation. Yet, despite the
airlines’ role in facilitating globalization, government policy has limited the
sector’s ability to fully participate in it.
While sectoral cyclicality will continue to challenge aviation, as any other
sector, government policy should not contribute to its instability. Attention to
aviation’s tax burden and dropping existing ownership restrictions are sensible
places to start. The federal government should also ensure that aviation is not
hobbled by special rules and taxes not borne by other industries or modes of
transportation.
Canada’s Aviation Tax Burden
Last year, the federal, provincial and municipal governments collected roughly $1
billion in revenue from the air transportation industry in Canada. This money
came from taxes and fees that are levied on airports, commercial carriers or
2 C.D. Howe Institute Commentarypassengers at various points in the value chain. Individually, each tax serves a
defined purpose, and some — such as the $4.67 security surcharge for domestic
travel — are relatively innocuous. Collectively, however, they add up to a very
large number, especially when it is compared to the $282 million of combined
profit that the industry’s three dominant players, Air Canada, Jazz and WestJet,
reported in 2005.
The following is a list of the different avenues through which the government
and other agencies collect revenue from air transportation and a brief analysis of
their respective rationales. This list excludes taxes of general application — such as
payroll, corporate income taxes, capital taxes, etc. — that are levied on most
industries in Canada. We also focus on taxes related to passenger transportation,
leaving aside, for this report, the increasingly important air cargo sector (see Table
1).
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Table 1:  Summary of Canadian Air Transportation Taxes and User Fees on Domestic 
Air Travel
Tax/User Fees Amount Rationale
Input Taxes on Domestic Air Travel Percent Tax Equivalent US Fee
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Sources:  Air Canada, Air Transat, Transport Canada, airport authority annual reports, NAV Canada, Department
of Finance, authors’ calculations.Airports and Ground Rent
Canada’s largest airports are operated by autonomous airport authorities that took
over the operation and financing of various airports from Transport Canada
during the 1990s, creating the National Airport System. All airport authorities are
non-profit, non-share corporations. They pay what is called ground rent to the
federal government for the right to operate airport facilities on federally owned
land. The government gave these facilities, built by Transport Canada, to airport
authorities at no upfront cost, with rent payments intended to compensate Ottawa
for foregone revenue, investments and land costs. Airport land values have never
been precisely assessed, casting doubt on the currently appropriate rent.
In May of 2005, then-minister-of-transport Jean Lapierre announced a ground
rent formula for Canadian airports to replace the prior formula based on
passenger throughput. The new rent formula is calculated using gross revenue
and is graduated by the level of revenue.
2 Most large airports now pay an
incremental rate of 8, 10 or 12 percent of total revenue to the government, with
Toronto Pearson, Vancouver and Montreal in the 12 percent bracket.
The formula is problematic because of the vicious circle it creates for airports.
If rent is calculated as a percent of revenue, then the price of every aeronautical
service an airport provides must be marked up by at least the amount of rent
charged. This, in turn, increases the airport’s break-even point and raises the
amount of revenue that must be generated. Suppose that the operating cost of
maintaining parking facilities at an airport is $250 a day: the airport must charge
parking fees that will generate daily revenues of at least that much in order to
break even. However, if the airport must pay 10 percent of all its revenues in rent,
then the airport’s rent will equal $25 a day, which effectively raises the operation’s
costs and, in turn, increases its break-even point by $25 to $275 a day of revenue. If
the airport generated $275 a day from parking services, its rent would increase to
$27.50 and, again, its operating costs and break-even point would rise.
3
Another flaw in the current rent formula is that it fails the test of economic
efficiency: there is no connection between the amount of airport rent paid and the
imputed rental value (opportunity cost) of the bequeathed government assets and
land. Indeed, under the current formula, the highest amount of rent is charged
against the airports that have expanded the most since facility ownership was
transferred to them.
At most airports, federal ground rent as a percentage of airport expenses has
been in general decline over the last few years. Average rents have declined from
nearly 40 percent of operating and interest expenses in 1999 to less than 25 percent
in 2005. This is not to say that airport rents have been declining in absolute terms.
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2 Zero percent on the first $5 million, 1 percent on the next $5 million, 5 percent on the next $15
million, 8 percent on the next $75 million, 10 percent on the next $150 million and 12 percent on
any amount over $250 million. This new formula is being phased in gradually with full
implementation to occur in 2010. Source: Transport Canada,
http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2005/05-h098e.htm#bg2 
3 The formula is x’=x/(1-x) where x is the rent rate on revenues and x’ is the effective rate on
operating costs. A 12 percent statutory rate tax on revenue becomes a 13.6 percent tax on revenue
to cover operating costs and a 10 percent rate becomes 11.1 percent.In fact, the amount of rent paid has grown faster than passenger travel, which was
the previous basis for calculating rent. Federal ground rent has declined as a share
of airport costs owing to the rapid rise of airport operating and interest expenses,
which grew 61 percent between 2002 and 2005 (or 141 percent from 1998 through
2005). Rent per passenger reached a new high in 2005, at $4.75 per passenger flight
(see Table 2).
As the new rent formula is a tax on revenue, it affects airports’ incentives to
seek additional revenue sources, because the airport must charge higher rates to
cover any rent due from a new source of revenue. It is easier for Canadian airports
to increase rates for airlines and passengers, because airports have some locational
monopoly power over landing slots, rather than on revenues from sales of goods
and services available outside of airport precincts. The rent formula thus increases
an airport’s incentives to use its monopoly power over airlines relative to other
airport tenants. Revenue sources other than landing or improvement fees make up
36 percent of total airport revenues for the median airport in Canada (see Figure
1), whereas they are more than 50 percent at airports in Asia, Europe and the
United States (Graham 2003).
Since Canada’s airport authorities are not-for-profit entities, they pay no
corporate income tax and instead pay ground rent to the federal government.
However, unlike the rent formula, the corporate income tax permits companies to
deduct interest expenses from their taxable earnings, which reduces the effective
cost of borrowing. A corporation with a relatively high debt-to-asset ratio will
have a lower effective tax rate, because of interest deductibility and the tax
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Table 2: Compiled Financial Data for Eight Major Canadian Airports, 1998–2005 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998
C$ millions, except as indicated
Total Operating and Interest
Costs (excluding rent) 1,262 1,125 974 786 733 635 562 524
Total Rent Paid to Transport
Canada 303 275 248 253 249 241 222 195
Total Aeronautical Revenue
Collected 898 790 638 566 541 515 458 418
Total Airport Improvement
Fee Revenue Collected 472 386 320 294 225 164 192 115
Total Other Revenue 602 561 524 502 518 491 446 420
System Wide Number of
Passengers 64 60 55 54 57 60 59 57
Rent Per Passenger 
(Total Rent Paid/ Number 
of Passengers) 4.75  4.57  4.53  4.66  4.38  4.01  3.78  3.43 
Rent as Percentage of
Operating and Interest
Costs 24% 24% 25% 32% 34% 38% 39% 37%
Sources:  Airport financial data from airport authority annual reports, passenger data from Transport Canada.deduction for asset depreciation. Hence, a corporation wanting to expand often
finds that debt financing is its lowest cost source of capital, net of taxes. The
airport rent formula takes no account of asset depreciation or airport authorities’
need to borrow to finance the investments that would increase passenger services,
flows and revenue. The rent formula thus increases the effective after-tax cost of
debt by requiring rent payments on the revenue collected to cover interest
expenses.
Therefore, the most important implication of the new rent formula is arguably
how it affects airports’ capital spending decisions. For example, to provide the
immediate funding for building and operating facilities, Toronto Pearson
borrowed substantially, whereas most other Canadian airports maintained
relatively light debt loads by paying for improvements with pay-as-you-go airport
improvement fees. Building a capital base to finance expansion exclusively with
retained earnings, however, takes many years and may thus postpone necessary
investments (Tretheway 2000).
A further cost to Toronto Pearson, specifically, was that it was required to
spend over $700 million to purchase Terminal 3; the only privately built-for-profit
terminal in Canada and the only facility for which an airport authority had to pay.
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30Toronto Pearson paid for the terminal and continues to pay rent on the revenue
generated to cover the debt service charge of the original purchase. Toronto
Pearson has undergone the largest, and by far most expensive, expansion and
redevelopment of any airport in Canada — while facing a difficult tax
environment. As other airports contemplate large expansion projects that depend
on borrowed funds,
4 rather than pay-as-you-go airport improvement fee
financing, they too must anticipate a high effective financing cost. Meanwhile,
ownership of improved facilities will revert to the federal government when their
operational leases end. Whereas debt financing is the only source of external
capital available to large Canadian airports, many European airports have been
privatized as for-profit corporations, thus enabling them to finance expansion
through new infusions of equity. In the US, airports are managed by government
bodies and benefit from tax exemptions on municipal bond issues, allowing them
to borrow at relatively low cost. In 2005, US airports also received $3 billion in
government funding from fuel and ticket taxes.
Fuel Taxes
Taxes were first introduced on aviation gasoline during the 1970s, during which
time the federal government operated and financed Air Canada and all aviation
infrastructure. Jet fuel taxes were initially an indirect way of having users pay the
costs of airports and navigational facilities; however, during the mid-1980s federal
jet fuel taxes were increased as a deficit-fighting tool.
Currently, all the provinces and the federal government levy excise taxes on
aviation jet fuel ranging from 0.7 cents per litre in some provinces to 4.0 cents per
litre federally, although federal and some provincial taxes do not apply on
international flights. The effective rate of tax on fuel is dependent on the market
price of fuel, which has nearly doubled in the last four years, resulting in a halving
of the effective tax rate (see Table 3).
The wide variation in fuel taxes and differences in exemptions have a number
of impacts. Firstly, provinces without fuel tax exemptions on international flights
are less attractive to carriers connecting to international destinations. Secondly,
airlines have an incentive to practice fuel arbitrage between provinces, known in
the industry as “tankerage.“ For example, a plane going from Calgary to Regina
will fill up with as much fuel as possible in Calgary to reduce the amount of fuel it
needs to take on in Regina, where the cost of filling up the tank is higher.
5
Notwithstanding the fact that aircraft carrying extra fuel will, in turn, burn more
fuel, because of the added weight, airlines will tank fuel if the price difference
between provinces is sufficient to justify the cost of burning more fuel. The result
is an economic distortion — wasted fuel, and more environmentally harmful
exhaust.
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4 For example, Vancouver Airport has a $1 billion capital program to meet the increased passenger
flows expected from the 2010 Winter Olympics.
5 Of course, provincial governments with higher tax rates on fuel may lose revenue to provinces
with lower taxes, as planes will avoid fuelling up in high-tax provinces if they have the
operational flexibility to do so.At present, the federal government provides very little aviation infrastructure,
with most airports and all navigation services operated and funded by private
authorities. Provinces provide no aviation infrastructure, and provincial fuel tax
flows into general revenue. Governments have no justification, currently, for these
taxes.
One potential, and increasingly popular, rationale for the jet fuel tax would be
that it addresses the environmental externality of greenhouse gas emissions from
airplanes, which is by many measures a worse pollutant than road or rail travel
(CE Delft 2004). Although this argument has some merit, there are alternative –
and potentially, more effective – tools to tackle the environmental externality of jet
fuel. One idea is the introduction of an emission trading system, which will be
discussed later in this report.
There are several identifiable flaws with fuel taxes that are designed to reduce
emissions and improve the environment. The first is that they ignore the fact that,
in the current high energy-price environment, airlines already have strong
incentives to minimize fuel consumption: for most airlines, jet fuel is the largest
single cost component (ATA 2006).
6 Examples of reducing weight to marginally
reduce fuel consumption include stripping paint off aircraft, removing pillows and
blankets, or replacing wine bottles with paper boxes. Second, akin to the solidarity
tax, they are arguably regressive. Third, the longer-term solution for airlines
wishing to reduce their fuel consumption, and thus emissions, is for them to
8 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
6 Labour has previously been the highest cost component of passenger travel.
Table 3:  Effective Fuel Tax Rate by Province on Domestic and International Fuel, 2004
Province  (Federal 
and Provincial Tax)
Tax Rate on 
Domestic Flights
Tax Rate on 
International Flights
percent






New Brunswick 15.4 0.0
Prince Edward Island 11.1 1.7
Nova Scotia 11.6 2.1
Newfoundland 11.1 0.0
Federal Tax Only 9.5 0.0
Canada Average 14.7 4.3
US Federal Tax Only 3.9 0.0
US Federal and State Tax
a 9.2 0.0
Note: 
a On state fuel taxes, exemptions on out of state fuel usage and caps on tax collected per carrier in 
certain states are not included; 9.2 percent is thus likely an overestimation of the true fuel tax burden. 
Sources:  Air Canada, Air Transat, Transport Canada, US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, US Air Transport 
Association, authors’ calculations.purchase new aircraft with more efficient engines, which fuel taxes make more
difficult to finance.
US fuel taxes are important in comparing tax burdens. At a combined rate of
9.2 percent, fuel taxes in the US are levied at a lower rate on domestic fuel than in
Canada. Also, US federal jet fuel taxes are apportioned to the Airport and Airways
Trust Fund, which finances air traffic control, airport improvements, and other
aviation related infrastructure.
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Airlines that service the US and Canada are able to fuel their Canada-bound
planes tax-free in the US. This creates an incentive for aircraft departing from US
airports with tax-free fuel on board to continue on to Canadian destinations using
their low-priced fuel. Should American carriers be given the right to fly directly
between two Canadian cities, they would be able to take advantage of this tax
exemption in the US, while Canadian carriers operating domestically would be at
a cost disadvantage. Alternatively, if the entire North American market were
opened to service by US and Canadian airlines, the incentives to tank fuel between
jurisdictions would be greatly exacerbated, given the current patchwork of fuel tax
exemptions on transborder flights.
Ticket Charges:
Infrastructure and Security Fees, and Sales Taxes
Until 1998, the federal government collected a tax on all tickets to fund air
infrastructure. This charge has been removed and private organizations, such as
NAV Canada and airports, levy specific charges on tickets to pay for aviation
infrastructure. Table 1 shows the rates charged as well as other fee examples based
on a sampling of airfares conducted by the authors.
NAV Canada: NAV Canada operates the airspace and navigation system over
Canada, effectively the “highways of the sky.“ NAV Canada purchased its
navigational equipment from the federal government and receives no operating
subsidy. Surcharges levied on passenger tickets help airlines pay for NAV Canada
operations.
8 Air traffic control in the US also receives a sizeable subsidy from
general government funds — US$1.7 billion in 2004 — to cover the difference
between operational revenues and costs of service provision (FAA 2005).
9
Airport Improvement Fees: After corporatization, airports began levying user
charges for passengers departing airports to pay for infrastructure. In comparison
to the equivalent charge in the US — the passenger facility charge — the Canadian
fee is a much higher share of base fares, as noted previously. Airport improvement
fees are used to pay for future capital expansion, but to link current payments
with future investment suggests an intergenerational inequity, if the beneficiaries
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7 Similar arrangements prevailed in Canada before the privatization of air transport infrastructure.
8 In contrast, provincial governments, through revenues from road fuel taxes, largely finance road
infrastructure, such as intercity highways.
9 Subsidizing air traffic control from general revenues would make little economic sense if one
believed that the benefits of air traffic control were internalized by the users of the system.of future investments do not directly pay for them.
Security Charges: Before September 11, 2001, airports and airlines were responsible
for airport security. An airline industry safe from terrorist attacks benefits
passengers and the public at large. As the September 11 events showed, the
negative effects of attacks on aviation security extend beyond aircraft and
passengers themselves: aviation security generates a positive externality for
society as a whole. A proper public finance policy would account for this
externality by providing public funding for the provision of security so that those
who benefit also contribute to the cost of provision. However, the Canadian Air
Transport Security Authority (CATSA) has spent less than the amount collected
from travelers through the Air Travelers Security Charge (ATSC) and projects air
security spending to be cumulatively less than ATSC revenues through 2007
(Department of Finance 2006). An economically efficient funding framework
would closely tie fees, security spending and its beneficiaries.
In the US, travelers and airlines partially fund security costs. In 2005, security
fees totalled US$2.2 billion, collected from the security fee on each ticket and from
one levied directly on airlines, whereas the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) spent US$4.5 billion on aviation security (TSA 2005).
As subsequent attacks in Madrid, London, and Mumbai (formerly Bombay)
have shown, trains and buses are no less susceptible to terrorism than airplanes.
However, bus and train passengers are not levied an additional charge to help pay
for the costs of their security — even though the federal government spends
approximately C$50 million per year on road and rail safety and security, in
addition to the recently announced security funding for urban transit and
passenger rail.
10 An allocatively efficient public finance regime would equate the
share of benefits society received from security with the share of total costs paid
by government.
As to the passenger fee itself, charging everyone the same amount per flight is
less economically shrewd than other options, given that there is a straightforward
way of establishing who is willing to pay more for convenience while not
compromising security. A more efficient security system would permit passengers
who have cleared a security check and paid a higher fee to bypass traditional
security lines each time they travel. Among the potential benefits: this would
remove low-risk security threats from the screening process, freeing resources for
inspecting higher risk passengers. The revenue generated from higher paying
passengers could reduce (or eliminate) the amount paid by other passengers. It
would also be a self-selective process, differentiating between high- and low-risk
passengers, rather than selective screening of those who may or may not be higher
risk. Such a system is being enacted in the US at a number of airports.
11
Paradoxically, the ATSC may have led to more passenger deaths than it has
potentially saved by deterring terrorist attacks. The security fee encourages people
10 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
10 Transport Canada recently announced $37 million for urban transit, with a total of $254 million to
be spent on transportation security: http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2006/06-
h138e.htm.
11 Such an example is the "Clear" program in place at Orlando International Airport, and soon to be
implemented in Cincinnati, Indianapolis and San Jose. See http://www.flyclear.com/ for details.to substitute more highway travel for the relative safety of air travel.
12 This is
particularly acute on short-haul leisure flights where passengers are most price
sensitive, where road alternatives are practical and where the security charge
makes up a larger share of the base fare.
13 Although it is impossible to say
whether the increased security measures have successfully deterred any terrorist
attacks, it would be ironic if a charge intended to improve passenger security has
caused greater societal harm.
GST/HST/QST: The GST applies to the base travel fare, insurance surcharges,
airport improvement fees, as well as to the ATSC and NAVCAN surcharge. From
the same sample of fares, the total GST collected represents an average of 8
percent of the base fare. Travelers in Quebec or the Atlantic Provinces face a
greater cost than travelers from the rest of the country, as the other provinces do
not apply PST on air travel. In contrast, state sales taxes in the US do not apply to
any commercial flights as air travel is deemed interstate commerce.
Comparison with Other Sectors and Other Countries
The Marginal Effective Tax Rate Model
The long and varied list of taxes and fees complicates measuring the fiscal burden
that Canada’s airlines currently bear. These challenges notwithstanding, the
marginal effective tax rate model is a useful tool for doing so. Its main advantage
is that rather than simply measuring taxes paid as a percent of profit, the effective
tax rate on marginal costs calculates what taxes an industry (or firm) incurs to
produce one unit of output, in the form of tickets for passenger travel. Each input,
meaning capital, labour and fuel, and facility charges in the case of airlines, has a
specific marginal effective tax rate. The marginal effective tax rate reflects the
increase in cost for each given input attributable to taxes on the last, or marginal,
unit of transportation service produced. For example, if the cost of fuel is 50
cents/litre without taxes but is 60 cents/litre with taxes, the marginal effective tax
rate on fuel is 20 percent ((60-50)/50 = 20).
The effective tax rate on marginal costs is a summary measure that weights the
effective tax rate on each input by the share of each input
14 in total costs; it is thus
a function of the marginal effective tax rate on each input. For example, because
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12 Although a direct comparison of highway and air travel safety is not possible, the evidence
generally indicates that most types of air travel are safer than all but the safest types of highway
travel (Barnett 1991).
13 The ATSC, as a share of base fares, is as high as 9 percent, based on the authors’ calculations.
Waters and Yu (2003) estimate that the increase in auto injuries is between 75 and 140 per year
and that auto fatalities increased between 0.97 and 1.78 per year due to the initial extra cost of the
ATSC using the initial $24 round-trip security fee. As the security fee has declined (whether or
not security delays and inconveniences have declined) the expected number of auto accidents
attributable to diversion from air travel has declined.
14 We use a Cobb-Douglas marginal cost function (see Appendix for the equation form). The
methodology follows McKenzie, Mintz and Scharf (1992) and a detailed description of the
marginal effective tax model and the related methodology used in this report can be found in the
Appendix.12 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
labour in Canada tends to be taxed at a lower rate than capital or fuel, businesses
that are relatively labour intensive will have a tax advantage over more capital
and fuel intensive businesses — such as airlines. Using the effective tax rate on
marginal costs to compare the tax burden on output between the airlines and
other modes of passenger transportation — such as rail — is also relevant because
both industries theoretically produce the same output (namely, moving people)
with the same general inputs, albeit in different mixes. Ticket taxes are applied on
the industry output (tickets), GST is incorporated into the model, and security
charges are included for air transportation.
15 NAV Canada and airport
improvement fees are assumed to have benefits equal to the charge applied to
tickets and are not included in the calculations.
The Effective Tax Rate on Marginal Costs for the Airline Industry
A sizeable discrepancy exists between the effective rates on airlines producing
domestic travel versus international travel. Specifically, assuming that the input
shares for domestic and international travel are the same, the effective tax rate on
marginal costs for the former market is 16.8 percent while on the latter it is 11.2
percent. There are three main reasons for this difference: (i) airlines pay less fuel
tax on flights headed for international destinations due to many exemptions; (ii)
there is no federal or provincial sales tax applied to flights outside continental
North America; and (iii) the higher base fares on international flights skews
downward the proportional impact of the security surcharge (see Tables 4, 5 and
6).
Based on the split of the total number of passenger journeys in the domestic,
transborder and international markets,
16 we calculate a weighted average effective
tax rate on marginal costs of 14.5 percent for the Canadian airline industry as a
whole. In comparison, the effective tax rate on marginal costs for the oil and gas,
manufacturing and retail industries are 5.9 percent, 13.1 percent and 12.4 percent
respectively.
17 There are three key reasons why the tax burden on the marginal
cost of air travel is high. First is the taxes and fees that air travelers and airlines
pay on tickets: the combined rate of the security fee and the GST is 12.4 percent of
base fares on domestic travel and 11.7 percent for the industry as a whole (see
Table 5). Second, the airline business is relatively capital and fuel intensive (recall
that capital and fuel are taxed more heavily than labour). Finally, other capital-
15 ATSC is included in ticket tax calculations since we do not attempt to quantify the effective safety
subsidy given to rail and bus passengers. Furthermore, including the ATSC on airline tickets is
justified due to the federal government's surplus of revenues over costs for security and because
airports were responsible for security prior to government control in 2002.
16 A more accurate measure of domestic, trans-border and international travel composition would
be passenger-kilometres. However, data on the number of international and trans-border air
travel passenger-kilometres are not readily available. For the comparative purposes of this paper,
the tax measure of domestic air travel is most similar to other modes analyzed that are assumed
to operate entirely in the confines of Canada.
17 Calculated using input shares from (McKenzie, Mansour and Brûlé 1998), capital tax rates from
(Chen and Mintz 2005, 2006) and from labour tax rates calculated by the authors.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 13
intensive sectors (such as resources) tend to have more favorable capital cost
allowances, lowering the marginal effective tax rate on capital.
Intermodal Comparison
When compared to the effective tax rate on marginal costs on other modes of
passenger transportation, the airlines are also at a distinct disadvantage.
Specifically, the effective tax rate on marginal costs of producing passenger train
travel is 10.6 percent. This captures the impact of the operating subsidy VIA Rail
Table 4:  Marginal Effective Tax Rates and Cost Shares of Inputs by Mode
Cost Shares




61.8 14.9 23.3 0.0
Passenger Rail 59.7 8.3 32.0 0.0
Passenger Air Travel 37.3 35.9 22.3 4.5
Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Inputs




8.7 30.3 47.7 0.0
Passenger Rail 7.1 28.7 28.6 0.0
Total Air Travel 7.4 9.4 27.4 24.0
Domestic Air Travel 7.4 14.7 27.4 24.0
International Air  Travel 7.4 3.5 27.4 24.0
Sources:  Authors’ calculations from Transport Canada data and annual report, Airline and Airport Authority 
Annual Reports, Department of Finance, “Surface and Marine Transport,” Statistics Canada, Catalogue 
50-002, May 2005, “Rail in Canada,” Statistics Canada. Catalogue 52-216, January 2006. 
Table 5:  Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Outputs (Tickets)
Rail Bus Total Air Domestic Air International Air
percent
6.0 6.0 11.7 12.4 3.9
Source:  Authors’ calculations from airline booking websites.14 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
receives from the federal government. However, even if that subsidy did not exist,
the airlines would still have a higher effective tax rate on marginal costs. This is
mainly due to two factors. First, ticket taxes on airline travel are higher than on
rail travel. Second, a highly taxed input (fuel) makes up a far larger share of airline
costs than it does for rail.
Notably, the effective tax rate on marginal costs on passenger bus
transportation is even higher than for both air and rail travel. This reflects: (i) the
higher fuel taxes on diesel fuel; (ii) the fact that bus companies pay a prorated
sales tax in some provinces on the buses they purchase while aircraft purchases
are exempt from sales taxes;
18 and (iii) the capital cost allowances for buses are
even less favorable than they are for aircraft. However, this calculation does not
account for the implicit subsidy that bus travel receives by not directly paying for
the infrastructure (highways) it uses. If fuel taxes paid by the bus industry are
taken to be user fees that underwrite the cost of roads, then the effective net-of-
benefits tax rate on diesel fuel is zero.
19
On the other hand, air passengers pay directly for NAV Canada air navigation
infrastructure and revenue from jet fuel taxes is not allocated to aviation
infrastructure so, in our calculation, NAV Canada fees are not included in output
taxes. If the road infrastructure subsidy implicitly available to the bus industry
were taken into account, domestic air travel would show higher effective rates
taxes on costs than rail or bus transportation.
US-Canada Comparison
Finally, there is a striking difference between the calculated effective tax rate on
marginal costs on domestic air travel in Canada and domestic air travel in the
United States. Specifically, the former (16.8 percent) is substantially higher than the
latter (12.0 percent) for the following reasons:
18 Rail companies also pay some provincial sales taxes on rail cars and locomotives.
19 The total expenditure by all levels of government on road infrastructure in 2004 was
approximately $14 billion while total revenue from all vehicle fuel taxes and licences was also
also approximately $14 billion. In 2005, total fuel tax revenues were less than the capital
investment and maintenance expense on roads. Figures for revenues from vehicle licences are
assumed to all be from land-based vehicles. Source: Transport Canada Annual Report.
Table 6:  Effective Tax Rate on Marginal Costs by Mode
Rail Bus (Gross of Fuel
Tax Benefit)
Bus (Net of Fuel
Tax Benefit)
Total Air Domestic Air International Air
percent
10.6 21.1 16.2 14.5 16.8 11.2
Source:  Authors’ calculations from data in Tables 4 and 5.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 15
￿ The US imposes lower fuel taxes on domestic flights; 
￿ The US has lower ticket taxes and no sales tax on ticket purchases. In fact,
their ticket and federal fuel “taxes“ are effectively user fees that all go into
financing the operations of air traffic control and airports. When
incorporating the infrastructure paid for by fuel tax revenue, the net-of-
benefits effective tax rate on marginal costs for US domestic air travel is
10.5 percent;
￿ The only ticket tax that is included in the calculation of the US domestic
effective tax rate on marginal costs is the post-September 11 security fee,
which makes up a lower percentage of the average base fare than the ATSC
in Canada; and
￿ US airports pay no rent to the federal government, so no such tax is passed
on to airlines. In fact, they are implicitly subsidized through tax-exempt
municipal bonds issued by the governments that own the airports (see
Table 7).
The gap between the two countries’ effective tax rates on air travel narrows in the
international arena. Travel abroad from the US is taxed at 8.9 percent, compared to
11.2 percent in Canada’s case. Significant discrepancies, however, still exist.
American travelers pay for the costs of immigration and customs services, and an
international departure and arrival tax, whereas Canadian travelers only pay a
slightly increased ATSC on international travel and no user charges for customs
and immigration, as well as no GST. By charging international travelers less than
the true cost for customs and immigration services and charging an only slightly
higher ATSC for international flights, the Canadian government implicitly favours
international over domestic travel.
It is beyond our scope to determine whether the effective tax rate on either
domestic or international air travel in Canada is too high in an economic sense, or
the respective US rates are too low, as this would require identifying true
economic costs. What we can conclude, however, is that the playing field is not
level and that these distortions need removing if the North American air travel
market is to be fully liberated.
Two deregulations that Canadian officials have openly considered include
cabotage (allowing foreign carriers to carry passengers on direct domestic routes)
or a modified “sixth freedom“ that would permit, for example, American
operators to fly passengers from Toronto to Vancouver via an American airport
Table 7:  Effective Tax Rate on Marginal Costs, US Air Transportation





Source:  Authors’ calculations from US Air Transport Association, US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 
Canada (2005), Brazell and Mackie (2000).16 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
like Chicago. In the latter case, the current fiscal framework would offer an
American airline with the competitive advantages of paying no fuel taxes,
connecting in a lower cost American airport, and benefiting from the Canadian
government’s subsidization of customs and immigration costs.
Government Income (Subsidy) Per Passenger Journey
In addition to the effective tax rate on marginal costs calculation, we have
measured the net government income from air transportation on a per passenger
journey basis, to compare it to the passenger rail sector in Canada and with the
aviation sector in other parts of the world.
Canada’s aviation sector is again disadvantaged. In 2005, the combined levels
of government collected a net $4.95 per passenger journey from air travelers on
industry specific charges, compared to the $45.20 net subsidy per passenger
journey on the rails.
20 While there may be political and/or social justifications for
the government’s more favourable treatment of rail over air passenger
transportation, an intermodal bias of this magnitude may be hard to rationalize in
purely economic terms, or in the context of tax neutrality specifically (see Table 8).
Two other disparities arise when this net income/subsidy per passenger
journey analysis is extended to a comparison between Canada and other countries.
The first is that in 2004 the Canadian government’s net income from air
transportation was higher than comparable countries such as France, Germany,
and the US.
21 The second disparity is that, with the exception of the US, rail
passengers in Canada also received the largest net subsidy per journey of $52.33 in
2004 (see Table 9).
Again, it lies beyond the scope of this paper to say what is the economically
correct amount of money that the government should be collecting from (or giving
to) each of these transportation modes. However, these differences comprise
economic distortions that limit Canada’s airlines in competing effectively in the
international arena with other airlines and in domestic travel with rail. They also
indicate the tax advantages that American carriers would enjoy if regulation
permitted cabotage or modified sixth freedom rights. Finally, these numbers
illuminate the magnitude of Canada’s bias against air travel. Indeed, as far as we
can determine, in no country other than the US is the gap between what the
government gives to rail passengers and what is takes from (or gives to) air
passengers wider than it is in Canada.
20 These figures do not include general taxes such as corporate income taxes or payroll taxes and
focus on the industry specific charges for rail and air travel. Certain taxes, such as municipal
payments in lieu of taxes (PILT) that airports pay have no equivalent in the rail industry. This per
passenger accounting approach does not take into account the opportunity cost of government
assets, such as airport land or CATSA capital equipment. However, the related cost of capital
does not greatly detract from the overall conclusion because the opportunity cost of airport land
is small in comparison to the overall balance (Gill 2005).
21 At the time of writing, 2005 numbers were not available for other countries.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 17
Table 8:  Revenue and Expenditures for Federal, Provincial and Local Governments by Mode 
of Passenger Transportation, 2004–2005
Aviation Via Rail
2005 2004 2005 2004
Government Revenue  C$ million











ATSC Charge collected by CATSA 383.0
b 409.6
c 0 0
Airport Rent Collected by Transport 
Canada
302.7 274.7 0 0
PILT to Local Governments (8 largest 
airports only)
87.9 79.6 0 0
Other Airport Fees 11.0 12.0 0 0
Aircraft Services Revenues 31.0 23.0 0 0
Total Government Revenue 1,096.8 1,057.9 5.1 5.1
Government Expenditures 





















Total Government Expenditures -781.4 -641.8 -190.3 -216.9
Net Income 315.4 416.1 -185.2 -211.8
Total Passenger Journeys 
In Canada (million)
63.7 60.1 4.1 4.0
Net Income Per Passenger (C$) 4.95 6.92 -45.20 -52.33
Notes:
a Extrapolated using previous data and the rate of increase of total fuel consumption by mode 
from Transport Canada Fuel Data.
b Data are for fiscal year 2004/2005.
c Data are for fiscal year 2003/2004.
d Includes subsidies to Via Rail only.
Source:  Local airport authorities annual reports, Via Rail annual reports, Transport Canada annual reports, 
Transport Canada Provincial and Federal Fuel Tax Revenue Data, Rail in Canada Catalogue 52-216 and 
Gill (2005).18 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
Assessment and Recommendations
Based on our analysis, and in the interest of tax neutrality, simplicity, and
efficiency, we urge the following measures with respect to taxation of the airline
industry.
Fuel Taxes
Major reform of the jet fuel tax is needed. The federal government and the taxing
provinces should harmonize their jet fuel tax rates and exemptions with other
provinces and the US.
22 This would reduce the incentive for airlines to “tanker“
their fuel from low tax jurisdictions. An even better solution would be to eliminate
fuel taxes altogether if, for environmental reasons, Canada was to move toward an
emissions trading system that included airlines.
23
Table 9:  Net Government Revenue (Subsidy) Per Passenger Journey, 2004
Canadian dollars
Canada
Passenger Rail Air Transportation
(52.33) 6.92
United States
Passenger Rail Air Transportation
(66.49) (2.75)
France
Passenger Rail Air Transportation
(12.28) (2.81)
Germany
Passenger Rail Air Transportation
(10.41) 6.33
United Kingdom
Passenger Rail Air Transportation
(4.66) 16.78
Notes: 2004 exchange rates: 1.30 Canadian dollars: 1 US dollar; 1.612 Canadian dollars: 1 euro. UK data
quoted in euros in Smyth and Pearce (2005). US data are net balance of Airport and Airway Trust Fund
and the net balance of the air travel component of the Transportation Security Administration 2004
budget.
Source:  European data from Smyth and Pearce (2005). Canadian data from Transport Canada, Statistics
Canada. US data from Amtrak annual reports; Federal Aviation Administration, Department of
Homeland Security, Bureau of Transportation Statistics; a slightly different methodology is applied to
2002 data in BTS (2004); however, the conclusion of a net subsidy is the same.
22 Keen and Strand (2006) argue that international coordination of fuel taxes is required. They argue
that if the environmental externalities of fuel are dealt with through other means (such as
through emissions trading) there is no economic justification for fuel taxes.
23 As highlighted most recently in “The Sky’s the Limit,” The Economist, June 10, 2006, 67-69) and as
being currently implemented in the European Union,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/aviation_en.htmHowever, even if a trading system fails to materialize, there is a case for
scrapping the fuel tax altogether unless it is earmarked specifically for either air
infrastructure or environmentally friendly investments. One idea for the latter is to
allow airlines to claim investment tax credits on the purchase of new, more fuel-
efficient aircraft or other environmentally targeted aircraft enhancements. That
said, targeted investment tax credits do have flaws, and it may be more efficient
for airlines to participate in a carbon credit trading system.
Airport Security
A safe and secure aviation network is in the interest of society as a whole and, we
argue, should therefore receive funding from general government revenues, much
the same way that public money is provided for securing the country’s ports and
urban transit. Canada should also follow the US lead in implementing a security
system to pre-clear registered travelers willing to pay for the convenience. This
would lower the number of travelers who need to go through traditional
government funded security lines, reducing wait times for other passengers and
the amount spent on security. The revenue earned from travelers paying for this
service, combined with some degree of government funding from general
revenues, could contribute to the removal of the ATSC that everyone else pays.
Removing low-risk, pre-cleared registered passengers from security lines will
allow greater resources to be spent on higher risk passengers.
The overall goal should be to reduce costs for travelers not willing or able to
spend the money, and to increase costs for travelers willing and able to spend for
extra convenience. Indeed, even if the government stops short of subsidizing
security and implementing the two-tiered system suggested above, it should at the
very least reduce the ATSC to a point where the program breaks even — or it
should increase spending on security such that wait times at airports are
dramatically reduced.
Airport Rent
As a first step towards addressing the problems of Canada’s airports, airport
authorities should be able to deduct interest expenses and depreciation charges
from the revenue used to calculate rent due. Without this provision, the rent
formula does not recognize that different airport authorities were bequeathed
facilities of different operational values at the time of corporatization and have
thus needed to make varying levels of investment in their facilities.
If limitations are placed on airport fee setting, as proposed in the recent Canada
Airports Act, airport authority credit ratings would likely be degraded, further
raising the cost of borrowing for airport authorities. Allowing for interest
deductibility in the rent formula would add the benefit of reducing the degree to
which airports rely on airport improvement fees (and increasing their reliance on
debt) as a means of funding expansions. This would facilitate lower ticket
surcharges for passengers (see below). However, we recommend the government
go further, and revise the rent formula so that Canada’s various airport authorities
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 19pay no more than the true imputed “rental“ value of the land and assets that they
inherited from the government many years ago.
Ticket Taxes and the “Solidarity“ Charge
The GST should not bear on the non-benefit-related fees that governments impose.
Furthermore, it would be unproductive for Canada to join the group of nations
levying an additional ticket tax on travel to finance development aid; this tax is
arguably regressive and cannot be justified in economic terms.
Capital Cost Allowances
Although we have identified less favourable capital cost allowances as one reason
for the airline industry’s high effective tax rate relative to other transportation
modes and other industries (such as resources), we stop short of recommending
that these rates be lowered for aircraft. The current CCA rate for aircraft is a close
match to the asset class’ economic depreciation rate. What should be considered —
although we do not explore it here — is a review of CCA rates for all transport
and related industries to ensure they are in line with economic depreciation rates,
so that tax neutrality can be achieved.
Improving Air Transportation Competitiveness
Overall, in terms of government income (or subsidy) per passenger, Canada’s
aviation sector is disadvantaged compared with its international counterparts, and
with other transportation modes at home. These differences comprise economic
distortions that limit Canada’s airlines in competing effectively. In reviewing
Canadian tax and subsidy policy toward all sectors, the overarching goal, from the
efficiency perspective, should be intermodal tax neutrality.
Too Heavy For Take-off:
Reducing Air Transportation’s Fiscal Burden
One final limitation of this report’s scope is that it precludes an estimation of how
much the aforementioned recommendations will cost the government to
implement. What we do know, however, is that the suggested policy changes will
have a number of effects on relative effective tax rates between the airline industry
and other modes of transportation, and that they will improve economic efficiency.
For example, increasing the amount that frequent flyers pay for security
through a registered traveler security plan will increase the effective tax rate on
travelers who have a low level of modal substitutability. Meanwhile, decreasing
the charge for non-registered travelers will decrease the tax rate on travelers who
are easily able to substitute other travel modes. As an exercise in estimating the
impact of a registered traveler program, tripling the ATSC (as a proxy for the cost
of registering for the program) would increase the effective tax rate on marginal
20 C.D. Howe Institute Commentarycosts for domestic air travel to 18.2 percent, while cutting it by one-third would
reduce the rate to 16.5 percent. Travelers would expose themselves to the higher
effective tax rate if their economic circumstances made it advantageous to use the
program. This would improve the economic efficiency of the fee structure by
levying higher taxes on those whose demand for air travel was relatively inelastic.
The effective tax on Canada’s airlines would also be reduced if the revenue
generated from fuel taxes was reinvested in programs or infrastructure that
benefited travelers or airlines. If the net-of-benefits airline fuel tax rate was zero
(as with federal fuel taxes in the US and for the Canadian bus industry) then the
effective tax rate on marginal costs for domestic air travel in Canada would be
approximately 10.6 percent, the same as for rail industry and similar to the rate on
the US airline industry.
Conclusion
The fiscal framework confronting the airline sector is harsh with respect to an
industry that many observers believe to be particularly important to Canada’s
economy. If the aviation sector is to be at its most productive in facilitating
personal and commercial travel, a revamp of taxation policy is required. 
We have identified sensible places to begin. Among them: reforming fuel taxes,
which are problematic in their unequal application across provincial and
international borders; balancing the government’s airport security-charge revenue
with spending on security; revising the rent formula so that Canada’s various
airport authorities pay no more than the imputed rental value of the assets that
they inherited from the government; and reducing the air transport sector’s
effective tax rate relative to other sectors. Finally, airline ownership restrictions
warrant review.
The federal government should ensure that Canada’s air transportation
industry is taxed on a level playing field with other modes of travel, such as bus
or rail, and with its international counterparts. The result would be a more
internationally competitive airline sector, able to serve Canadian air travelers more
efficiently and cheaply.
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 21Appendix A: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR)
We compare taxes between modes of transportation and across borders based
primarily on the effective tax rates on the marginal cost of production. Marginal
effective tax rates for the inputs of labour, capital and fuel are calculated for each
mode; other inputs, except for landing fees at Canadian airports for air
transportation, are disregarded. The marginal effective tax rate is thus the tax
wedge between the net and gross of tax cost for each input. The marginal effective
tax rates for each input are aggregated, and weighted by the relative share of each
input, to compute a single rate that reflects the effective tax rate on the firm's
marginal cost — the effective tax rate on marginal costs.
We assumed a Cobb-Douglas function for modeling marginal costs. Where T is
the marginal effective tax rate on marginal cost for each mode and is a function of
ti where i = l, f, k, af for labour, fuel, capital and airport fees at Canadian airports
and ai where i = l, f, k, af which is the cost share of each input where ak + af + al +





aaf — 1. We assume that the tax-shifting factor is identical across all
modes and industries and that the tax is fully shifted onto the user of inputs. 
a
The tax rate on marginal costs includes taxation at multiple stages of
production; for example, the effective tax rate for airports is passed on to the
airlines through higher landing fees. The marginal effective tax rate at airports is
calculated as the average amount of rent paid out of total operating costs,
excluding rent. We assumed that the full cost of rent is passed on to later stages of
service provision.
The model also accommodates operating subsidies. It reduces marginal costs
by the amount that subsidies comprise of total operating expenses (1-s) where s is
the share of operating costs that the operational subsidy comprises. For 2005, s is
estimated to be .343 for VIA Rail.
b Previous capital subsidies for VIA Rail are not
included in our calculation because the program has been suspended. As a Crown
corporation, VIA Rail pays all other taxes that other corporations pay: corporate
income taxes, provincial capital taxes, federal and provincial fuel taxes, etc. All
modes of transportation have the same general taxes applied to them, with
equations only modified to account for industry specific taxes as indicated.
There are limits to the methodology. Foremost among them are certain
empirical difficulties in estimating the effective tax rate and cost shares for each
input. For example, fuel taxes in Canada are imposed on a per litre basis, whereas
our model requires an ad valorem tax rate. The conversion is a function of the
market price of fuel. However, in an era of volatile fuel prices, the effective rate of
taxation varies based on the year of analysis. We used 2004 market prices for the
various types of fuel for the calculation, because that was the most recent year
where market prices and amounts consumed per province were available for all
modes.
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Notes:
a Previous research has applied a similar methodology to the Canadian and American transportation
industries; see McKenzie, Mintz and Scharf (1992 and 1997); or McKenzie, Mansour and Brule (1998)
for a more detailed description of the model used in this paper.
b 2005 Via Rail Annual Report.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 23
Capital taxes raise their own empirical issues, owing to financial reports' broad
definition of “capital.“ The aggregation of capital we used is an average of data
provided by the airlines. The methodology of summing 8 percent of the book
value of airline equipment plus depreciation costs and rentals follows the
methodology of Oum and Yu (2001).
Also, it is sometimes unclear as to what is a true tax versus what is a user fee
or benefit tax where the cost of a tax is defrayed by a service or good paid by the
tax. For example, the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan relieves employers of some
pension obligation to their employees. The gross of benefits tax rate on labour is
given as this most closely resembles the actual cost to the firm of a unit of labour.
Provincial payroll taxes are weighted by provincial revenue share for bus and air
transportation and fuel consumption for rail. Personal income taxes are ignored in
the labour tax calculation, owing to data limitations on income distribution by
mode of transport.
The problem of differentiating between a tax and a user fee is particularly
pertinent for the fees added on to air transport costs. Fees such as the NAV
Canada fee or airport improvement fees can be classed as user charges, which
approximate the cost of providing a service or financing a capital improvement
and as such are not included in the calculations. Security charges and GST for all
modes are included in the calculation of ticket taxes.
However, our model cannot take into account the nonmonetary burden placed
on air travel. One example is the increased hassle from security, particularly the
recent regulations on carry-on luggage and increased wait times. The hassle factor
may indeed be a greater influence on travel decisions than the additional
monetary cost (Rossiter and Dresner 2004). The model also excludes regulatory
burdens, such as the extra cost of capital for the airline industry as a result of the
limit on foreign investment and property taxes.
We calculated ticket tax rates for various domestic and international flights for
travel on August 16 or 17, 2006, which were collected on July 10, and again for
flights on September 28 or 29, which were collected on August 23, 2006, from Air
Canada and WestJet’s websites using the lowest advertised price of the two days.
HST and QST are excluded from all calculations. 
For the US, the only comparable tax is the post-September 11 security charge
because all other charges have a definable benefit roughly equal to cost of the
charge. However, in the case of international travel, we included arrival and
departure taxes as well as any customs and immigration fees. For the purpose of
comparison with Canada, we included these fees in the calculation rather than
attempting to quantify the implicit Canadian federal subsidy for those costs.24 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
Table A-1: Cost Shares of Inputs for US  Air Transport Industry
Labour Fuel Capital Landing Fees
percent
US Passenger Air Travel 40.7 36.0 20.0 3.2
Source: Air  Transport  Association.







Passenger Domestic Air  8.1 9.2 5.4 26.3 0 3.0
Passenger International Air 8.1 0.0 0.0 26.3 0 9.7
Passenger Total Air 8.1 4.3 3.9 26.3 0 4.3
Note:  Fuel tax rate computed using 2004 fuel prices.
Source:  US Air Transport Association; US Bureau of Transportation Statistics; US Department of Labour; 
Department of Finance, Canada; Brazell and Mackie (2000). Ticket taxes calculated from JetBlue, US 
Airways and Southwest Airlines websites on July 12, 2006, for travel on August 24 using the lowest 
advertised price.References
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